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Hazard Concerns 
MIC at Bhopal and Virginia and the Indian Nuclear Liability Act
Nasir Tyabji
Oblivious to the anger and outrage expressed 
throughout the world after the methyl isocyanate leak in 
December 1984, the continued storage of MIC at the 
parent West Virginia plant until 2011, despite several 
accidents, indicates the limited effect of public safety 
concerns on corporate strategy. As in India, neither the US 
executive nor the judiciary seemed capable of 
withstanding pressures exerted by the chemical 
processing industry. This is an ongoing story of struggle. 
What gave Bhopal a fresh salience in the public mind 
was the Indian government’s proposal to buy nuclear 
power reactors from the US, and to agree to legislation 
which would satisfy US manufacturers of the limits to 
their liability. Disconcertingly for the government, the 
Bhopal chief judicial magistrate’s judgment in 2010 led 
to an explosion of public fury, forcing the government to 
introduce clauses in the nuclear liability legislation laying 
down responsibility on the technology supplier. If 
organic chemicals have awakened the world to the 
dangers of chemical substances, Bhopal brought home 
the fraught nature of industrial processes involving 
exothermic reactions.
This paper was presented at the workshop on “Hazardous Chemicals: 
Agents of Risk and Change (1800-2000)” organised by the Deutsches 
Museum Research Institute, Department of History, Maastricht 
University, and Rachel Carson Centre for Environment and Society, 
Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Munich, on 27-29 April 2012. The 
author is grateful to Jesim Pais for his comments on an earlier draft. 
Nasir Tyabji (ntyabji@gmail.com), an economic historian with interests 
in the areas of technology, innovation and industrialisation, lives in 
New Delhi.
1
The leakage of methyl isocyanate (MIC) from the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal in December 1984 had pro-found implications in many areas of public life.1 Efforts 
at effective regulation of industrial processes which involved 
storage of hazardous material, usually intermediates and 
fi nal products in the chemical industry, can be dated from 
the worldwide political reactions to the accident (CE 1985c; 
EC 2012). Subsequently, attention moved to the elaboration of 
the design principles that should underlie the construction of 
industrial plants which generated hazardous chemicals, and 
the legislative and administrative measures that would ensure 
compliance with these principles (CE 1986b). It also brought 
into prominence MIC and its chemistry; until then this had 
been an obscure intermediate of relevance, principally, to the 
pesticides industry (C&EN 1985).2 Ironically, in terms of the 
history of chemistry, too, the “biography” of MIC could be said 
to end, also in 1984, when DuPont commercialised a consider-
ably more capital-intensive technology by which MIC became 
truly an intermediate, in a process which did not require its 
storage. It was now merely a stage in a continuous process to 
manufacture pesticides (C&EN 1985; CE 1986b).3 A second end 
to the biography could be dated to 2011, when Bayer, now own-
ers of the parent Union Carbide plant in Virginia, agreed to 
close it after years of protest by residents of the adjoining small 
town (Bayer 2011).4
However, what gives the history of this chemical fresh salience 
are a series of developments seemingly unconnected techno-
logically. In 2008, the Indian government declared its intention 
to buy several nuclear power reactors from the United States 
(US) and agreed to a new legislation which would satisfy US 
manufacturers of the limits to their liability (Varadarajan 
2008). The US fi rms wanted liability (in the case of nuclear ac-
cidents) to be confi ned to the plant operator and to a maxi-
mum of $450 million. Liability for design defects from the equip-
ment supplier was fi ercely opposed. By this time, however, the 
design defects in the MIC plant which led to the 1984 disaster 
were well known, as was the inability of the Indian judiciary 
and executive to pinpoint and get compensation in cases of 
poor design or even deliberate instances of “under-design” 
(CE 1985b; 1986a). With the announcement of a long-delayed 
verdict on compensation, there was an explosion of public 
anger which forced the government to introduce clauses in the 
nuclear liability legislation laying down responsibility on the 
technology supplier. In effect, the legislation was a refl ection 
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that neither the executive nor the judiciary-could be expected to 
uphold the rights of victims of humanly-created disasters, as 
both were vulnerable to powerful international pressures. 
Given the implications of the Bhopal case, the transfer of pub-
lic concern from one hazardous technology (bulk production 
of MIC) to another (nuclear power generation) is not only of 
signifi cance to the way in which technological developments 
are driven, but should rightfully be viewed as part of the ca-
reer of MIC, and therefore of its biography.
As has been mentioned, MIC had been principally used in 
the pesticide industry. This paper starts with a brief over-
view of its laboratory examination, and then proceeds to its 
application in a proprietary process for the manufacture of a 
carbamate pesticide, carbaryl. As the Bhopal tragedy arose 
from the specifi c industrial technology used by Union Carbide, 
the paper examines the lengthy process which preceded the 
ultimate closure of a comparable large MIC production and 
storage facility in the US. This involved legislative and admini-
strative measures in the US, along with mobilisation of the 
local community and workers in the plant. The paper con-
cludes with a discussion of the effect of public recognition of 
the similarities in hazards posed by large-scale chemical reac-
tions and nuclear reactions into a major innovation, of long- 
term equipment supplier liability.
2
Isocyanates were fi rst synthesised in 1849 by the double 
decomposi tion of a dialkyl sulfate with potassium cyanate. 
During the period 1885-1900, a considerable store of informa-
tion regarding the fundamental properties of isocyanates was 
discovered. Hentschel, in 1884, showed that an isocyanate 
could be obtained from the reaction between phosgene and 
the salt of a primary amine. This reaction was modifi ed by 
Gattermann and Schmidt, who claimed an almost quantitative 
yield of MIC by their procedure.5
However, it was not until some 40 years later that the practical 
uses of these compounds were realised. Signifi cant progress 
was slow, until the discovery of polyurethanes in 1937. How-
ever, by the late 1940s, the industrial applications of isocyanates 
had progressed to the point where such compounds were of 
major commercial interest, particularly in the fi eld of polymers. 
Evidence for this growth was found in the patent literature of 
the post-war years and in the reports of German industry. By 
1960, many isocyanates had been investigated. 
The 25 and more methods for the preparation of iso cyanates 
could be classed by the reaction involved. The most common 
method involved the reaction between an amine, or its salt, 
and phosgene. Curtius, Hofmann, or Lossen rearrangements 
and double decomposition reactions had also been widely 
used, in addition to a variety of miscellaneous methods. 
There were three isocyanates of major commercial impor-
tance. Apart from MIC, almost all of which was used to make 
carbamate pesticides, the other two were toluene diisocyanate 
(TDI) and 4,4/-diphenylmethanediisocyanate (MDI), both of 
which were used almost exclusively to make urethane and 
isocyanurate polymers. Small amounts of MIC and other alkyl 
monoisocyanates were used for other purposes; for example, 
in the manufacture of certain pharmaceuticals (C&EN 1985).
Commercialisation of MIC
The chemistry of methyl isocyanate (CH3NCO) was investigated 
and reported in 1927. However, it was not until the 
development of post-war interest in chemical pesticides, which 
led to the search for alternatives amongst pesticides, that MIC be-
came of commercial interest. The growth of resistance by certain 
insect species to chlorinated hydrocarbon insecticides had 
aroused research interest in alternative chemical classes.6 The 
handling hazard of many organophosphates emphasised the 
need for safer materials. In 1957, Union Carbide Corporation 
(UCC) announced the development of a carbamate pesticide, Se-
vin, known chemically as 1-naphthyl N-methylcarbamate, a fter 
four years of laboratory-scale and fi eld testing. It was synthesised 
by Lambrech in 1953 and subjected to laboratory, and preliminary 
fi eld tests, for two seasons. In 1956, Sevin was released for testing 
by government specialists in agricultural experimental stations. 
In 1958, it received the fi rst offi cial recommendation and was sold 
on an experimental basis. Unusual amongst organic insecticides 
at the time, it did not contain e ither chlorine or phosphorus. It 
had a distinct mechanism of operation on the nervous system to 
that of chlorinated hydrocarbons such as DDT, and had been dem-
onstrated to be safer in its effect on mammals (D’Silva 2006: 32).
There were several routes for manufacturing the item. In 
the original three-step process, patented by UCC, 1-naphthol 
was dissolved in aqueous caustic soda to form sodium naph-
thoxide. This was added to a solution of phosgene in toluene 
to yield 1-naphthyl chloroformate. In the fi nal step, the 
chloroformate reacted with methylamine to give 1-naphthyl 
N-methylcarbamate, or Sevin (Lambrech 1959). This was the 
process that UCC originally used when it started making 
Sevin in 1958 (C&EN 1985: 32). By 1966 this three-step process, 
held to be labour-intensive and unsuitable for modifi cation 
for continuous operation, was sought to be replaced by a new 
technology by which the product was obtained by the direct 
reaction of 1-naphthol with MIC.7 This reaction, carried out in 
warm benzene or toluene, gave an almost quantitative yield 
of the carbamate. In this process Carbaryl (Sevin) was pro-
duced by taking MIC, itself made by reacting methylamine 
with phosgene, and reacting it with 1-naphthol, i e,
Monomethylamine (MMC) + Phosgene —>  Methyl Isocyanate 
(MIC) 
Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) + 1-Naphthol —> Carbaryl
3
UCC was one of the earliest transnational corporations (TNCs) 
to invest in India. In 1924 it opened an assembly plant for 
batteries in Kolkata.8 The venture was offi cially incorporated, 
in 1934, with the name of Ever Ready Company (India). After 
a public issue of shares, the company, now named Union Car-
bide India Ltd (UCIL), diversifi ed into chemicals in the early 
1960s.9 The industries UCIL entered were technology and 
capital-intensive, requiring technically skilled labour (Khanna 
1984). These were still in the early stages of development and 
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UCIL leveraged the technologies available from its parent com-
pany to attain dominant market positions (Srivastava 1987: 36). 
In particular, the company utilised this strategy in the pesticides 
market, by claiming that it was then the sole producer of MIC in 
the world.10 In 1966, UCIL created the Agricultural Products Di-
vision (US 1985b: 11-12). In furtherance of the project, UCIL fi rst 
applied to the Government of India for a licence to manufacture 
pesticides in 1966. The Government of India, in response, 
granted a letter of intent to issue an industrial licence. A pilot 
plant was started near Mumbai, but, by a unilateral decision of 
the corporation in 1968, the facility was moved to Bhopal. The 
original letter of intent lapsed, and in 1970 UCIL wrote to the 
government with a new application, for which another letter of 
intent was granted in 1972. 
After evaluating the market potential, UCC management in 
1973 approved a proposal for the erection of manufacturing 
facilities for MIC and MIC-based pesticides (US 1985a). In Octo-
ber 1975, the government granted a licence to UCIL to produce 
5,250 tonnes of pesticides in Bhopal. The Union Carbide Engi-
neering Division in West Virginia was made responsible for 
engineering decisions, and plant construction. Its brief comprised 
conceptual design work, preparation of the design report (in-
cluding operating manuals), appointment of a project manager, 
and training of those UCIL employees who would form the 
initial operating team. UCIL paid UCC for engineering expenses, 
with a technical service fee for the use of UCC technology, 
patents, and trademarks as well as continuous know-how and 
safety audits (US 1985a).
In its renewed application, UCIL stated that technology from 
Union Carbide in the US now made the project feasible. The com-
pany claimed that in the previous three years, UCC had made 
dramatic improvements in MIC production technology.11 How-
ever, internal UCC documents show that the technology proposed 
had not been proven. A 1972 memo stated that “...The Methyl 
Isocyanate system has been operated a total of 448 days since 
start up in late 1965. Almost every item in this unit has failed and 
been replaced since start up.”12 In other words, over the 1,825 
days spread over the fi ve years from 1966 to 1971, the unit had 
been operational less than 25% of the time. Although the MIC 
technology sold to UCIL included the process improvements 
made over the fi rst MIC plant at Institute, West Virginia, built in 
1965-66, the plant in use in Virginia from 1978 onwards was 
more “streamlined”, and fully automated (D’Silva 2006: 56). De-
spite the actual construction of the Bhopal plant commencing in 
mid-1978, these process modifi cations were not incorporated. In 
addition, new processes were planned in India for two of the 
primary intermediates and even the MIC to Sevin transforma-
tions had limited trial runs at UCC (UCIL 1973: 12).
Explicit Violations
Although UCC designed the Bhopal plant based on the plans of 
the existing MIC unit in West Virginia, some design modifi ca-
tions were introduced.13 Evaluation of the minimum require-
ments of instrumentation “suiting Indian conditions” were 
specifi ed as an overall criterion, and pneumatic rather than 
electronic controls were to be used, because electronic parts 
were “not available” in India (D’Silva 2006: 47). Thus, while 
computerised alarms and crises control procedures linked 
critical systems at the West Virginia plant and other industry 
plants handling MIC had electronically controlled four-stage 
backup safety systems, Bhopal lacked similar sophisticated 
sensors to alert technicians (DSF 1985; C&EN 1985: 30). It had a 
manual, single stage safety system. There were no computers 
to assist in identifying when and where problems occurred, 
and to commence automated abatement procedures. To detect 
MIC leaks, plant management relied on workers to sense the 
escaping gas through eye irritation. This was in explicit viola-
tion of Union Carbide’s MIC handling procedures, which read, 
“Although the tear gas effects of the vapour are extremely 
unpleasant, this property cannot be used as a means to alert 
personnel” (New York Times 1985). 
During the design stage for the plant modifi cation to incor-
porate the backward integration, a difference of opinion arose 
over the question of creating substantial MIC storage capacity, 
comparable to the MIC plant at UCC’s West Virginia unit, or a 
nominal storage level, determined by downstream process re-
quirements (US 1985a).14 UCIL management supported this 
latter approach. UCC, however, planned to produce MIC to sell 
to industrial customers in India and other Asian countries 
(ICFTU/IFCEGWU 1984). This strategy led to the installation of 
three large 57 kilolitre storage tanks, two for MIC storage and 
one as a safety backup for excess gas (Union Carbide 1985).15 
The engineering division of UCC also had an incentive to decide 
in favour of a storage tank design that could be patterned on 
the existing UCC plant in West Virginia. 
Between 1977 and 1984, UCIL operated the plant for pesti-
cide production. Initially, this entailed the mixing of different 
chemicals to create pesticides, with UCIL importing the neces-
sary ingredients. In 1979 the company, through backward inte-
gration, modifi ed the Bhopal plant to not only manufacture 
pesticides, but also the raw materials including phosgene 
and MIC. 
Phosgene was manufactured by reacting chlorine gas 
(brought to the plant by tanker) with carbon monoxide, which 
was produced from petroleum coke by passing air over red hot 
coke in a production facility within the plant (Union Carbide 
1985). Monomethylamine (MMA) was also brought in by tanker. 
The MIC manufacturing process was carried out with equimolar 
ratios of phosgene and an amine in a solution of chloroform. 
The reaction of phosgene with MMA in the vapour phase led to 
the formation of methyl carbamoyl chloride (MCC). The reac-
tion products were quenched in chloroform, and then fed to a 
phosgene stripping still to remove the unreacted phosgene 
for recycling. The bottoms from the stripper were fed to a 
pyrolyser where MCC was decomposed into MIC and hydrogen 
chloride (HCl), which were further separated.16 The pyrolyser 
condenser fed the MIC refi ning still (MRS) where MIC was 
separated from the chloroform in the upper part and was led 
directly into a storage tank. The bottoms of the MRS containing 
residues of MCC, chloroform, and other by-products were col-
lected and recycled. The HCl which was formed was scrubbed 
with chloroform and extracted with water, producing aqueous 
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HCl which was disposed of by neutralisation. MIC was manu-
factured primarily to make the pesticide carbaryl (Sevin) as 
well as smaller quantities of other pesticides, aldicarb (Temik) 
and butylphenyl methylcarbamate.
Carbaryl was manufactured by the reaction of 1-naphthol 
with MIC. The MIC was gradually added to an excess of 1-naphthol 
in carbon tetrachloride solvent at 60-80 C, in the presence of a 
catalyst. The exothermic reaction had a yield of more than 95%. 
During the green revolution, pesticide use increased dra-
matically, jumping from 8,620 tonnes over six million hectares 
in 1961 to 65,000 tonnes over 100 million hectares by 1983. 
This growth attracted over 50 new pesticide fi rms offering 
more than 200 varieties (Srivastava 1987: 17). Due to this infl ux 
profi tability fl uctuated, leading Union Carbide to re-evaluate 
its once optimistic attitude towards the pesticide market. The 
UCC Management Committee’s decision to build an MIC plant 
in Bhopal faced serious questions of economic viability even 
before the commissioning of the plant (US 1985b: 30-31). The 
recognition of this fi nancial reality led the UCC management 
over the next couple of years to consider several alternative 
strategies of utilisation of the Bhopal plant, none of which 
succeeded. In the winter of 1978, with the project about mid-
way to completion, there was concern over both potential cost 
overruns and reduced estimates of the size of the pesticide 
market in India. The focus of discussion was whether a new 
design, smaller in scale, could be implemented at that late 
date. In the end, the decision was to maintain the basic design 
and proceed as originally planned because the project was 
too far advanced to pull back. The fi nancial prognosis, how-
ever, did not improve. In 1979, the Bhopal project was termed 
by UCC as the major critical issue in the operations of its 
worldwide agro-chemical business. Its problem was to be 
characterised as identical to the Institute, West Virginia plant’s 
problems – an oversized plant serving an undersized market 
(US 1985b: 31). 
Increased competition, droughts and saturation in the mar-
ket resulted in the Bhopal plant generating profi ts lower than 
predicted. Production levels at the Bhopal plant dropped 
throughout the 1980s, from 2,308 tonnes in 1982 to 1,647 
tonnes in 1983. The Bhopal plant contributed 8% of UCIL’s 
sales proceeds (New York Times 1984). By 1984, the plant was 
manufacturing a quarter of its licensed capacity of 5,250 tonnes 
(Fortun 2001: Introduction). Given fi nancial considerations 
and the fact that several of UCC’s divisions in the US were fal-
tering, the Bhopal plant was a prime candidate for divestiture 
(Srivastava 1987: 76). UCC decided to dismantle the plant and 
distribute manufacturing operations amongst other countries. 
This plan was abandoned after it met considerable resistance 
from the UCIL management (Dembo et al 1990: 91). 
As a compromise, UCIL was forced into considerable economy 
measures in the factory, including signifi cant staff reductions 
(Fortun 2001: 92). A new plan was developed in February 1984: 
the MIC unit, considered to be of strategic signifi cance to UCC
would be retained but the rest of the Bhopal plant would be 
disposed of (US 1985b: 36). UCIL would thus continue to manu-
facture MIC, but would not formulate pesticides. Despite a his-
tory of accidents at the factory, a variety of safety devices were 
left inoperative. In November 1984, UCC directed UCIL to close 
the plant and prepare it for sale (Fortun 2001: 133). 
However, before this plan materialised, the leak of MIC in 
December 1984 led to the permanent closure of the plant. On 
3 December, according to Union Carbide, approximately 
24,500 kg of un-reacted MIC escaped from one of the storage 
tanks together with approximately 11,800 kg of reaction products 
(AI 2004: 11). At least 15,000 people died between 1985 and 
2003 because of the gas leak. This is in addition to the 7,000 to 
10,000 people who died in the immediate aftermath, taking the 
total death toll to well over 20,000 (AI 2004: 12; BGIA 2008).
4
The UCIL plant’s location in a third world country led initially 
to responses that dismissed the disaster as something that 
could only occur in a country lacking a safety culture; a posi-
tion quickly undermined by an incident at the UCC factory in 
Institute, West Virginia in August 1985, which shared many of 
the characteristics of the Bhopal disaster except the number of 
casualties. In March 1985, three months after Americans 
watched on the evening news men, women, and children dying 
as a result of the accident at the UCC plant, the company’s chief 
operating offi cer, Warren Anderson, spoke to the United States 
Congress about the company’s Institute, West Virginia plant 
(Chess 2001: 181). He reassured senators that the plant had 
been examined with a “fi ne tooth comb”. The release of methyl 
isocyanate that caused the deaths in Bhopal was “inconceivable” 
in the US. According to a Harris poll, 50% of the respondents 
believed him. However, on the morning of Sunday, 11 August 
1985 less than fi ve months after Anderson’s assurances, release 
of aldicarb oxime from the UCC site led to more than 130 people 
having to be treated for eye, throat, or lung irritation. After the 
West Virginia incident, another Harris poll showed that 91% of 
the respondents now felt that government “should crack down 
a lot harder on chemical companies such as Union Carbide 
than they have” (Chess 2001: 181).
Located along the Kanawha River about 20 kms from 
Charleston, the Institute plant site covered about 1.4 sq km. 
The facility was built in 1943 by the US government for the 
production of rubber during the second world war. The plant 
was then bought and operated by Union Carbide, from 1947 
until 1986. In the US, the major consumption of MIC took place 
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in the production of insecticides, carbaryl, carbofuran, meth-
omyl, and aldicarb. Worldwide too, pesticide manufacture was 
the principal commercial use of MIC. Very small volumes of 
MIC had at times been used to manufacture pharmaceuticals, 
but it was uncertain how widely it continued to be used.17 
UCC had begun alternative MIC technology research in 
November 1976 (US 2011a). The initial research focused on the 
area of “adducts”, chemical structures that can, in principle, 
be easily added and removed from the desired chemical. The 
intention of introducing an adduct is to change undesirable 
characteristics of the chemical to which the adduct is attached. 
The adduct made MIC soluble in water and ultimately less 
hazardous should it escape containment. However, the MIC 
adduct was not easily removed and was found to contaminate 
the insecticide products. In July 1984, UCC researched a 
palladium-catalysed reaction that had the potential to com-
pletely eliminate both MIC and phosgene use. Here, the cost of 
the catalyst greatly outweighed any potential gains from this 
process. During its ownership, UCC reviewed 97 patents deal-
ing with alternative technologies to MIC production but 
concluded that none could perform as well as the existing 
process. In the last year of the facility ownership, UCC found 
three different pyrolysis techniques that showed promise in 
eliminating phosgene and reducing the MIC stock, but it sold 
the facility before completing the studies.
After the Bhopal MIC disaster, UCC sold its agricultural divi-
sion to the French chemical company Rhone-Poulenc SA (R-P). 
R-P continued the research into pyrolysis for a few years, but ul-
timately decided that the pyrolysis approach to manufacturing 
pesticides was not cost-effective. It also undertook research into 
different approaches to operating the processes that used MIC 
and phosgene, intended to reduce the stockpiles of both. In all, 
after fi ve new techniques studied, R-P concluded that either the 
stress placed on the process equipment was too great or the new 
process would be unacceptably diffi cult to control. It also con-
ducted research into various processes which would allow MIC 
to be synthesised and consumed in the process line. This form of 
production would eliminate the requirements for stocking MIC 
and could also remove the requirement of phosgene. 
R-P analysed the process that DuPont has developed but it did 
not adopt the technology, possibly due to patent restrictions. 
Finally, R-P reviewed what was thought to be a promising 
process proposed by Enichimica Sintesi (Enichem) in Italy. 
This process manufactured carbamates from a precursor of MIC, 
dimethyl carbonate, which avoided any need for MIC storage. 
In the process, which the company claimed was competitive 
with current methods, diphenyl carbonate reacted with MMA 
to produce methylphenyl urethane. Methylphenyl urethane was 
transformed into carbamate, co-producing phenol, which could 
be recycled (CE 1985a, b, c). This was proposed for a facility in 
Brazil, and the suggestion was that it could also be used at the 
Institute facility. The available historical records did not explain 
why R-P did not implement the Enichem technology (US 2011a).
By 1994, R-P was the only company in the US that was 
continuing the practice of bulk storage of MIC. The other two 
producers, Sandoz and DuPont, had switched to continuous 
“no storage, direct feed” processes, which consumed the MIC 
to make pesticides as soon as it was produced (US 1989: 2). 
DuPont had commercialised a closed-loop catalytic process 
using a reactor design that generated MIC from materials far 
less hazardous than the traditional phosgene and converted it 
to fi nished pesticide as it was made. The process involved the 
reaction of methyl amine and carbon monoxide which yielded 
N-methylformamide. This was subsequently oxidised to MIC 
in the presence of a silver catalyst (C&EN 1985, 1992). This 
production pathway was safer for both the environment and 
worker health and safety.
Hazard of MIC Storage
Thus by 1994, there were 13 plants worldwide that produced 
MIC, none of which stored substantial quantities of MIC. Bayer 
AG, which consumed all MIC produced in Europe stored minimal 
amounts of MIC on-site. Bayer had also patented a non-phosgene 
route to MIC that reacted either N’N-dimethylurea or methyl-
amine with diphenyl carbonate to produce the isocyanate, the 
co-product phenol could be recycled to diphenyl carbonate 
by reaction with phosgene or carbon monoxide (CE 1986a, b). 
Mitsubishi Kasei in Japan had also changed over to no storage, 
direct feed processes like the other US companies (Lapkin 
1994: 23). Degussa AG had patented a process for production of 
MIC from potassium cyanate and dimethyl sulfate. Some smaller 
pesticide producers in south-east Asia apparently generated 
MIC for captive use by this route. The higher costs of raw mate-
rials made this route uneconomical except in special circum-
stances (Lapkin 1994: 19). In Israel, the Makhteshim Chemical 
Works at Beer Sheba had reportedly developed an MIC-free 
way to make its “carboryl” insecticides. The fi rm was said to 
react alpha-naphthol and phosgene to get a chloroformate ester, 
which it then combined with methylamine to make the active 
ingredient in carboryl (CE 1986a, b). 
Thus, of the users of MIC worldwide, most produced MIC con-
tinuously and converted it as it formed, relied upon other pro-
ducers’ facilities to produce pesticide products on their behalf 
at the site of MIC production (known as tolling arrangements), 
or imported fi nished pesticide products or intermediates made 
with MIC. Public policy repercussions stemming from Bhopal 
had markedly changed the manufacturing and handling proce-
dures of MIC. In the United States and Europe, rail or road ship-
ments across state or country boundaries had been banned. 
Producers of MIC-based products had either to locate directly 
adjacent to an MIC plant, or to develop low volume closed-loop 
systems for immediate conversion to the fi nal product.
In addition to using MIC for its own manufactures, R-P was the 
sole supplier of MIC to other companies that used it to make their 
own carbamate pesticides. DuPont, for example, used it to make 
Lannate (its brand of methomyl). FMC used it to make carbo-
furan, which was marketed by it (and also by Mobay) under the 
name Furadan. R-P also made another carbamate insecticide, 
methomyl, for Shell Chemical, which marketed it under the name 
Nudrin. And there were a number of other smaller volume cus-
tomers. The arrangements must have been profi table for R-P and, 
presumably, for its customers, as well. R-P was thus the only 
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p roducer of MIC that was utilising the substance for multiple end-
products. While this made the task of reducing inventories more 
complex, one other worldwide producer, Mitsubishi Kasei of Ja-
pan, was known to be engaged in no storage, direct feed produc-
tion for multiple end products (Lapkin 1994: 23)
The production and storage of MIC at the Institute, West 
Virginia facility represented a long-standing safety concern to 
the surrounding community, dating back to when the plant was 
owned by UCC.18 There had been a number of accidents at the 
Institute plant. Between 1980 and 1984 there were 28 leaks of 
MIC according to UCC’s records. As mentioned earlier, 135 peo-
ple were affected by a leak of aldicarb oxime from the then Car-
bide plant in Institute. Another MIC-related accident occurred at 
the plant in 1990. As a result of this history, and especially after 
a major explosion in 1993, an informal alliance had formed of a 
local community group, People Concerned about Methyl Isocy-
anate (PCMIC), a union representing some of the workers in-
side the plant (the Affi liated Construction Trades, or ACT) and 
offi cials and professors from the West Virginia State College. 
The alliance had demanded that the company fund a fully in-
dependent, comprehensive safety audit of the facility, with an 
auditor selected and supervised by the community and work-
ers’ organisations. The proposal for this audit was modelled 
after a legally binding agreement between a R-P facility and its 
neighbouring community in Manchester, Texas.
In June 1992, a serious accident had occurred at an R-P 
chemical plant in Manchester, Texas as a result of a release of a 
cloud of sulfur dioxide. At least 27 people were sent to area 
hospitals. With the assistance of a state-wide environmental 
organisation, Texans United, the community won an agree-
ment which gave them specifi c rights never before recognised 
in Texas. R-P agreed to pay for an independent environmental 
audit by an expert selected and supervised by a panel of 
community residents and Texans United. The agreement was 
legally binding because it was integrated to the fi rm’s operat-
ing permit under the hazardous waste law.19
A similar agreement was being sought in Institute, West 
Virginia. While safety measures might help to reduce the likeli-
hood of disaster, nothing but eliminating the large inventories 
of MIC at the site could ensure that a Bhopal-like disaster in-
volving an MIC release would not occur in Institute. Therefore, 
any independent safety review had to focus on appraisal of MIC 
inventory reduction options. However, while R-P was forced into 
the strong Texas agreement by well-organised community 
pressure culminating in a challenge to the fi rm’s proposed 
operating permit, it had not been willing to match its Texas 
agreement, in the absence of such pressure tactics in West 
Virginia. R-P offi cials explicitly stated that they would not allow 
a comprehensive community controlled safety audit consistent 
with the Manchester, Texas model.
In June 1994, PCMIC decided that this issue could not wait; 
they secured the services of two national service organisations, 
the Good Neighbour Project (GNP) for Sustainable Industries 
and the Environmental Careers Organisation (ECO), to com-
mence an evaluation of MIC inventory reduction at the plant. 
These national organisations commissioned an inventory 
r eduction evaluation, asking R-P to cooperate in this assess-
ment. However, they were denied both a site visit and the de-
tailed information that was needed to complete an appraisal. 
R-P also acknowledged in a meeting in November 1994 that 
they had never conducted an economic assessment of the fea-
sibility of eliminating MIC storage through a no-storage direct 
feed approach. Despite the company’s lack of cooperation, an 
analysis using publicly available data was published in Octo-
ber 1994, and circulated to the company and other experts 
(Lapkin 1994). Meanwhile, there was an explosion in August 
1994 in the methomyl-Larvin pesticide unit of the plant fol-
lowed by a leak and fi re in February 1996. 
The problem lay in the design of the plant complex. MIC was 
fed through three pipes to four pesticide manufacturing units 
(Ward 1994: 2). The fi rst fed both R-P’s methomyl-thiodicarb 
(Larvin) and FMC Corporation’s carbofuran (Furadan) units. 
The second and third pipes ran to R-P’s aldicarb (Temik) and 
carbaryl (Sevin) plants. Since both carbaryl and methomyl 
were already manufactured by continuous processes, the direct 
feed of MIC from the production unit to each of these reactors 
by proportional pumps could eliminate the need for substan-
tial MIC storage for these pesticides, probably reducing MIC 
storage by more than 70%. Adapting the other two product 
lines, aldicarb and carbofuran, to this direct feed approach 
would, however, require their conversion from batch to con-
tinuous processes, which was likely to require substantial 
investments (Lapkin 1994). R-P, however, continued to hold 
publicly to the position that to remove MIC inventories entirely, 
there would have to be separate MIC production facilities for 
each downstream plant (Ward 1994: 6).
Safety Issues
After Bayer purchased the Institute facilities in 2001, it formed a 
team to review the overall safety measures and handling proce-
dures for MIC, re-evaluating the existing literature relating to al-
ternative methods of producing MIC (US 2009: 14-15). In May 
2003 the team concluded that the current process was as safe as 
other alternative methods to produce MIC at Institute. This 2003 
memorandum did not explain which alternative methods Bayer 
considered or whether the “close-coupled” process implemented 
by DuPont was among them. The memo also did not discuss the 
extent to which the company analysed the costs and benefi ts of 
changing its storage or inventory procedures. Instead, the memo 
recommended that Bayer should consider adding measures to 
mitigate the potential damage from an MIC release. The company 
concluded that forcing MIC inventory levels down appeared feasi-
ble, but would be costly. Although Bayer continued R-P’s efforts to 
evaluate the Enichem process that would eliminate phosgene and 
the MIC stockpile, ultimately it reported that a by-product of this 
reaction led to the degradation in the effectiveness of the pesti-
cide by nearly 50% (US 2011a). 
There continued to be a series of gas release related inci-
dents for some years (US 2011b). An Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) agency review of the plant in 
July 2005 cited the plant for eight serious and two wilful 
violations, which included violations of rules governing the 
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management of highly hazardous chemicals. However, ac-
cording to the offi cial record, when US government shop fl oor 
safety offi cials inspected the plant in October 2007, they found 
no violations (CG 2008). 
The situation changed dramatically in August 2008. An ex-
plosion inside a tank used to decompose waste methomyl blew 
the 2,500 kg tank into the air and across the plant. Only “ran-
dom chance” sent it in the opposite direction from the MIC “day 
tank” located just 30 metres away. The waste tank contained 
about 9,500 litres of chemicals, including methomyl, when it 
exploded. Chemical pipes and venting systems in the unit were 
also broken open, and their contents released. These decompo-
sition products include chemicals such as methyl isocyanate, 
hydrogen cyanide, acetonitrile, carbon monoxide, dimethyl 
d isulfi de, nitrogen and sulfur oxides, and methyl thiocyanate. 
For almost 25 years, there had been little chances of the suc-
cess of the campaign led by PCMIC in Institute, a small, unin-
corporated and mostly black community of 1,500 that grew up 
around the university. However, the 2008 incident that killed 
two workers and sent projectiles dangerously close to an 
aboveground MIC storage tank brought new scrutiny from the 
United States Congress and Chemical Safety Board. The explo-
sion also showed larger, more affl uent communities in the 
Kanawha Valley that they, too, could be in danger; towns that 
the community in Institute could not help but notice were pre-
dominantly white. In all, about 3,00,000 people lived in the 40 
km MIC “vulnerability zone”, which included the capital.
As of August 2010, Bayer had claimed that it had not found 
an alternative to MIC suitable for its products manufactured in 
West Virginia (US 2011a). It also claimed that it had improved 
safety and upgraded equipment after the 2008 incident, and 
that it had eliminated all aboveground MIC storage. There had 
been no supply onsite since August 2010, when the overhaul of 
that unit began and it was planned to reduce future stockpiles 
by 80%. MIC production was to be phased out entirely in 2012 
as a part of a corporate restructuring, after meeting the demands 
of the farming community in the 2011 season (CG 2011b). 
Abruptly, however, in January 2011, Bayer announced that it 
would stop making, using and storing MIC at its Institute plant 
as part of a corporate restructuring, involving an agreement to 
phase out the pesticide aldicarb because of concerns that it 
posed unacceptable dietary risks, especially to children. The 
facility would stop production of aldicarb, the active ingredi-
ent in its Temik brand insecticide, by the end of June 2012. By 
then, Bayer had also planned to stop production of carbaryl, 
the active ingredient in the Sevin brand pesticide. Both prod-
ucts were part of the carbamate family of pesticides and had 
been largely substituted by newer products, prompting a re-
view by the company of its carbamates business.
But the facility and the products it made with MIC were 
already under a variety of pressures. Following a May 2009 
ban on the use of the pesticide carbofuran in food, FMC Corp 
in August 2010 stopped producing that material at the 
Institute site. Leasing plant space at Institute, FMC made 
carbofuran in part with MIC that it purchased from Bayer. 
And Bayer had already announced in August 2009 that it 
would reduce its MIC inventory by 80%, by not rebuilding its 
methomyl-Larvin pesticide unit where the 2008 explosion 
occurred (CG 2011a). 
In explanation of its sudden decision not to restart the MIC 
unit, Bayer cited the OSHA’s ongoing inspection of the unit. OSHA 
had said it might not complete its work, which had started in 
March 2011, in less than six months. This timeline would prevent 
the company from meeting the demands of the 2011 crop season 
for the pesticide Temik, which was made using MIC (CG 2011c). 
Thus ended the effective stored life of MIC, tied as it had been to 
the production facilities at West Virginia, and given notoriety by 
the leak at the plant designed on its model at Bhopal.20
5
However, what gives the history of this chemical fresh salience 
are a series of developments (only) seemingly unconnected 
technologically. In 2005, the Indian government announced 
that it proposed to buy several nuclear power reactors, from 
the US and elsewhere and agreed to new legislation which 
would satisfy US manufacturers of the limits to their liability. 
The US fi rms wanted liability (in the case of nuclear accidents) 
to be confi ned to the plant operator and to a maximum of $450 
million. Liability for design defects from the equipment sup-
plier was fi ercely opposed (Raju and Ramana 2010). 
Comparable Danger Posed by Nuclear Power
Signifi cantly, 25 years previously, a professional chemical en-
gineering journal had in the aftermath of the Bhopal disaster 
noted a defi ning moment in the public perception of the 
chemical processing industry (CPI) (CE 1985a). In response to 
this public mood, both industry and the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) in the US had recognised the close simi-
larities in post-accident scenarios in these two industries. In 
1980, sometime after the Three Mile Island accident, the 
NRC and the Federal Emergency Management Administration 
(FEMA), which coordinated responses to natural and manmade 
disasters, wrote a new rule. Its provisions called for siren 
warnings within a 16-km radius of nuclear power plants, mock 
emergency exercises in which community organisations 
participated, and the development of emergency evacuation 
procedures. NRC coordinated with nuclear power utilities to 
develop appropriate plans, and then it and other federal and 
state agencies decided whether a power plant could be licensed. 
The emergency response plan was only a part of the overall 
licensing process. An offi cial at NRC felt that it would be 
appropriate to extrapolate their experiences to the chemical 
industry. An industry observer felt that the chemical industry 
was facing a situation similar to the one encountered by the 
nuclear industry 15 or 20 years earlier. The nuclear industry 
had then attempted to respond to sociopolitical concerns with 
technical jargon and without any sensitivity to public opinion. 
The journal concluded by noting the distinct possibility that 
the United States Congress would mandate that the Centre for 
Public Integrity (CPI) be subject to controls similar to those 
that the nuclear power industry operated under. Although 
subsequent history showed that public concern could not 
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override the CPI’s lobbying prowess, this social recognition of 
the comparable levels of danger posed by nuclear power in-
stallations and chemical processing facilities was a harbinger 
of Indian reactions to the nuclear liability issue.
In its legal suit against UCC, the Government of India had 
introduced the legal concept of “multinational enterprise 
liability” (Mokhiber 1985). This raised the issue of whether the 
liability of a TNC was limited to the extent of its local assets in 
the host country, as UCC argued, or whether it was the global 
entity as a whole that was liable, given that the damages 
exceeded local net worth as the Government of India argued. 
Although the attempt by the Government of India to have the 
trial in the US was rejected, this was an early indication of 
how public opinion in India viewed the question of supplier 
liability. By this time, the design defects in the MIC plant or 
even deliberate instances of “under-design” which led to the 
1984 disaster were well known. It had also become known that 
the effects of the leak had not only immediate effects, horrify-
ing in themselves, but long-term effects across generations; 
thus the full extent of the disaster began to be comprehended. 
As in the case of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the victims were 
not only the workers and general population in the affected 
areas of the city, but their children and possibly subsequent 
generations with no reliable end point.
‘Miscarriages of Justice’
Finally, what made “Bhopal” a term universally associated with 
horrifi c industrial disasters was the inability of initiatives taken 
under the legal system in India to adequately encompass the 
scale of the disaster in terms of fi xing liability and raising ade-
quate compensation for the victims, their families and their 
progeny. Decisive political action by the Government of India 
could possibly have overcome this liability, but with its overrid-
ing objective of attracting further foreign investment, a politi-
cal demand for adequate compensation was inconceivable. It 
was with this in mind that the government passed legislation 
which consolidated all claims compensations to itself enabling 
it to modulate these demands to its perception of internal and 
external political implications of any steps it took.
These were “miscarriages of justice” at the political and ex-
ecutive levels. The judiciary was equally contemptuous of the 
dimensions of the calamity (Gonsalves 2010). The Supreme 
Court took a number of steps that effectively circumscribed 
the penalties that could be imposed. Initially, it presided over 
an out-of-court settlement for a small sum of money. Later, 
under public pressure, it conceded the potentially criminal 
nature of the disaster. However, in a momentous order, it 
prescribed that the offences could only be tried under the 
category of manslaughter. It was under this legally imposed 
infi rmity that when the court of the chief judicial magistrate 
in Bhopal fi nally decided the case in June 2010, almost 26 years 
after the disaster, the punishment awarded was a two-year 
term of imprisonment and a nominal fi ne. 
Even before the judgment of the chief judicial magistrate was 
announced in 2010, movements organised in support of the Bho-
pal victims had formed an alliance with movements protesting 
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Notes
 1 During the early morning hours of 3 December 
1984, about 40 tonnes of methyl isocyanate 
escaped from a storage tank at the Union Car-
bide plant at Bhopal. The cloud enveloped the 
residential colony surrounding the plant. In 
addition to the 7,000 to 10,000 people who 
died in the immediate aftermath of the gas 
leak, at least 15,000 people died between 1985 
and 2003, taking the total death toll to well 
over 20,000 (AI 2004: 12; BGIA 2008). 
 2 A search in Chemical and Engineering News 
archives, from its inception in 1923, demon-
strates that 85 of the 88 articles referring to 
MIC date from the Bhopal gas disaster.
 3 However, a review of isocyanate chemistry 
published in 2001 noted that MIC remained 
one of the six most industrially important spe-
ciality monoisonates. See Richter and Riester 
(2001): Table 3.
 4 This left the bulk production of MIC in the 
hands of fi rms in China (C&EN 2011).
 5 The fi rst three paragraphs are based on a read-
ing of the reviews of isocyanate chemistry by 
Saunders and Slocombe (1948), Shoichiro 
(1972), Tarbell (1976), Union Carbide (1976) 
and Richter and Riester (2001).
 6 This, and the following paragraph, is based on 
material in C&EN (1957) and Back (1965).
 7 There is some uncertainty about the date when 
MIC was actually introduced into the carbaryl 
production process. Although both D’Silva 
(2006: 34) and US (1985b: 17) agree that MIC 
production began in late 1965/1966, Chemical 
and Engineering News, in its analysis of the 
Bhopal gas leak, states that “…UCC had started 
manufacturing MIC around 1957, mostly for 
sale, but also for use in producing its own soil 
pesticide Temik (aldicarb). For reasons it 
would not disclose, it changed to the MIC route 
for making Sevin as late as 1973” (C&EN 1985: 
32). 
 8 For a critical view of UCC history and commer-
cial practices, see Dembo et al (1990).
 9 Up to 1956, the Indian subsidiary was wholly 
owned by the parent company in the United 
States. After the public issue of shares, UCC’s 
holdings fell to 60% (D’Silva 2006: 34). This 
was further reduced to 50.9% in 1977-78 
through a rights issue, in which UCC did not 
participate, after the amendments to the 
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act in 1973 
(D’Silva 2006: 36).
 10 D’Silva (2006: 209) Appendix A-6, Letter from 
UCIL to the Ministry of Petroleum and Chemi-
cals seeking permission for visit of engineers to 
the US. 
 11 In direct contradiction, according to a news re-
port, for fi ve years UCIL’s application for an in-
dustrial licence lay pending, with offi cials in 
the Ministry of Industrial Development feeling 
that its “technology was obsolete” and being 
“dumped in India”. Finally, four months after 
the Emergency (1975-1977) was declared, the 
licence was granted. The entire department 
was against granting the industrial licence, 
according to R K Sahi, who was then deputy 
d irector in the ministry. “We knew that it was 
discarded technologies being transferred to 
India. It was obsolete in the US, but it was 
being dumped in our country. We all knew 
that”, Sahi told The Hindu on Monday (Jebaraj 
2010).
 12 UCC internal memo addressed to Gordon E 
Rutzen, UCC engineer involved in design of 
Bhopal Plant in 1972 (US 1985b: 17).
 13 Plants for production of carbon monoxide (CO) 
and 1-naphthol were designed specifi cally for 
Bhopal. In the fi rst case, methane used in the 
West Virginia plant was unavailable in Bhopal, 
and was replaced by coke. Here, too, a com-
mercially available process using coke was re-
jected because licence fees payable in dollars 
would have added “unnecessarily” to project 
costs, while coal of a suitable quality was not 
available. The Virginia 1-naphthol plant used 
“sophisticated technology” and “unusual mate-
rials of construction”, and was suitable for 
large scale production. None of these condi-
tions, it was held, was appropriate for the 
Bhopal plant (UCIL 1973: 10-11). In the event, 
the custom designed 1-naphthol plant in Bho-
pal faced so many problems that it was never 
used (US 1985b: 34).
 14 When the plant was fi rst designed, Edward A. 
Munoz, the managing director of UCIL, took 
the position that large volume storage of MIC 
was contrary to both safety and economic con-
siderations. In a sworn affi davit to the Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation considering 
the Bhopal case, Munoz said that he had 
recommended, on behalf of UCIL, that the pre-
liminary design of the Bhopal MIC facility be 
altered to involve only token storage in small 
individual containers, instead of large bulk 
storage tanks. However, UCIL was overruled by 
the parent corporation, which insisted on a design 
similar to UCC’s Institute, West Virginia plant 
(ICFTU/IFCEGWU 1984). See also (C&EN 2009).
 15 The allowable tank size in Europe, Japan, and 
the US was 17.5 kilolitres, with a mandatory 
maximum 50% fi lling limit (Mehta et al 1990).
 16 Pyrolysis is a term for chemically decomposing 
organic materials through heating – a form of 
thermal decomposition. 
 17 An example was cimetidine (Tagamet), an 
antiulcer agent which originally utilised MIC 
in a manufacturing step; here the producer, 
Smith Kline, had changed to a different synthetic 
route. Eli Lilly originally used MIC in the US as 
a reactant to produce tebuthiuron (Spike). 
However, they had moved their production 
operations to Brazil, and simultaneously rede-
signed their process to eliminate the use 
of MIC.
 18 The following paragraphs in the main text are 
based on information in Lapkin (1994).
 19 Among the features of the agreement were a 
broad audit, which included review of regula-
tory compliance, safety training, accident pre-
vention, emergency response, waste analysis 
and information systems, monitoring pro-
grammes, and waste minimisation practices; 
public disclosure of company documents, in-
cluding hazard assessment and risk analysis, 
lists of accidents/upsets/near-misses/correc-
tive actions, and waste minimisation and re-
duction plans; R-P committed to “negotiate in 
good faith” on the audit recommendations; cit-
izens were entitled to accompany the auditor 
and conduct other inspections by appointment. 
 20 According to a report in July 2011, Bayer was 
transferring its MIC production facilities to 
China (C&EN 2011).
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